Trump Quietly Ups U.S. Engagement With the Taliban

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.

The highlights this week: The Taliban release a U.S. citizen from captivity as U.S. officials visit Kabul, Bangladeshi interim leader Muhammad Yunus takes a four-day trip to China, and a bipartisan U.S. bill seeks sanctions on Pakistan’s powerful army chief.

Trump’s New Approach to the Taliban

Last Thursday, the Taliban released U.S. citizen George Glezmann after more than two years of captivity. His release came on the same day that Adam Boehler, the special presidential envoy for hostage affairs, and Zalmay Khalilzad, a former top U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, made an unannounced visit to Kabul—the first known visit by U.S. officials to Afghanistan since 2021.

Afghanistan announced on Sunday that the United States had lifted bounties on three Taliban leaders who were members of a faction called the Haqqani network, a U.S.-designated terror group that targeted U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Washington has not commented on the move, but Sirajuddin Haqqani—the most senior of the three—no longer appears on the U.S. State Department’s Rewards for Justice website.

These developments suggest a significant change in the U.S. approach to the Taliban regime since the group retook power in 2021. U.S. officials have periodically engaged with Taliban leaders, including two days of face-to-face meetings in Doha, Qatar, in 2023, and the two sides negotiated earlier deals to release captive U.S. citizens.

But generally, the United States has kept its distance from the Taliban under both former President Joe Biden and current President Donald Trump. Neither formally recognized the Taliban government, and Washington has tended to keep any engagement with the regime out of the public eye.

After the Taliban takeover, the United States announced that Qatar—which was involved in the Glezmann negotiations—would represent U.S. interests in Afghanistan, suggesting that Washington’s desire for future engagement was minimal.

The Trump administration’s new tack can be attributed to its transactionalism. Its limited objectives in Afghanistan include the release of remaining captive U.S. citizens and the return of U.S.-made weapons. There are other things that the White House may want later, such as assistance on counterterrorism. (Both the Taliban and the United States see the largely Afghanistan-based Islamic State-Khorasan, or IS-K, as a threat.)

The administration might hope that making concessions, such as lifting bounties and having U.S. officials visit Kabul—which bolsters the Taliban’s legitimacy—can help move the needle forward. The Biden administration didn’t want to be seen as rewarding the Taliban, given serious concerns about the group’s policies toward women and girls. The Trump administration is taking a more pragmatic approach.

The United States appears to be banking on getting things done with the Taliban’s political leaders in Kabul without having to go through the group’s hard-line senior leadership in Kandahar, which doesn’t engage with the West. This makes sense. Washington’s list of asks avoids the social and ideological issues that fall under the Kandahar leadership’s portfolio.

This week, Afghan channel Amu TV reported that it had obtained an audio clip of Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada calling for the United States and the Taliban to discuss a prisoner release deal that would swap “an Afghan” held at Guantanamo Bay for U.S. captives in Afghanistan.

The clip has not been confirmed to be Akhundzada, but it would suggest that the top Taliban leadership is endorsing talks between the group’s political leadership and U.S. officials.

The Taliban have their own reasons to support more U.S. engagement. Freeing U.S. citizens is a top Trump priority. This gives the Taliban regime leverage that it can use to propose more talks with Washington and push for its own objectives, such as the United States returning Guantanamo detainees, lifting bounties, providing financial assistance, and even easing sanctions.

Though recent communication between the United States and the Taliban may be fueled by transactional considerations, it’s worth keeping the geopolitical picture in mind. After initially holding off, China is now pursuing investment deals and scaling up diplomatic activities with the Taliban. Iran has recently signaled a greater willingness to engage with Afghanistan, too.

The Trump administration may be looking to play a long game, calculating that doing more with the Taliban—albeit on limited levels and in ways that fall short of formal recognition—can help counter inroads made by its rivals and competitors in Afghanistan.

What We’re Following

Muhammad Yunus in Beijing. Bangladesh’s interim leader, Muhammad Yunus, departed on Wednesday for a four-day visit to China. The trip marks the highest-level engagement between Beijing and Dhaka since Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigned under pressure last August.

Though Yunus’s visit has symbolic significance—marking the 50-year anniversary of bilateral relations—it will also be closely watched for geopolitical reasons, especially in New Delhi. Under Hasina, Bangladesh and China strengthened both economic and military ties, though the longtime leader’s closeness to India likely put some limits on the partnership.

Bangladesh’s ties with India have since cooled, which might create space for expanding relations with China. India’s recent push to ease tensions with Beijing suggests that New Delhi may have fewer concerns about what Dhaka is up to. That said, any indications that Bangladesh and China are deepening their military partnership would not go over well with India.

The main focus of Yunus’s trip will likely be economic. Yunus is expected to pitch bringing more Chinese production to Bangladesh as well as  try to negotiate lower interest rates and longer repayment periods on Chinese loans. Trade and investment will also be on the agenda: China is Bangladesh’s top trade partner, and it has pledged $40 billion for Belt and Road Initiative projects and other ventures.

U.S. bill seeks to sanction Pakistani army chief. On Monday, U.S. Reps. Joe Wilson and Jimmy Panetta introduced the Pakistan Democracy Act, bipartisan legislation that calls for sanctions on Pakistani Army Chief of Staff Asim Munir and other current or former officials who the bill alleges have suppressed democracy, including through the persecution of political opponents—chief among them imprisoned former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan.

The bill calls for sanctions to be placed on Munir within 180 days of its enactment. (It also stipulates that sanctions can be waived if Pakistan’s democracy is restored or if all political prisoners are released.) Regardless of whether the bill passes, it will unnerve Pakistan’s civilian and military elite. Pakistan’s army chief is considered the country’s most powerful figure, and one who successive U.S. administrations have seen as a critical interlocutor.

The bill also reflects the successful advocacy efforts of pro-Khan Pakistani Americans—efforts that have concerned leaders in Islamabad since a U.S. congressional resolution that decried assaults on democracy in Pakistan passed last year by an overwhelming margin.

U.S.-India trade talks heat up. Brendan Lynch, the assistant U.S. trade representative for South and Central Asia, is leading a delegation in New Delhi this week to engage in trade talks. The trip follows a visit to Washington by Indian Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal this month. Much is at stake as Trump prepares to implement a reciprocal tariff policy—expected on April 2—that could hit India hard.

India has long been in Trump’s tariff crosshairs due to its high average tariff rates, a nearly $50 billion trade deficit in India’s favor, and large differences between U.S. and Indian tariffs. Trump has recently repeated that the new reciprocal tariffs will not spare New Delhi, but the country’s ongoing economic struggles make this an especially bad time.

Bloomberg reports that Indian officials will push for a “reprieve” during Lynch’s visit this week. That may be a hard sell, though India can cite a few compelling reasons why it deserves better treatment. It has already lowered a range of tariffs, increased its imports of U.S. goods by $3 billion in recent years; and pledged to cut tariffs on more than half of U.S. imports.

Still India might need to do even more to truly help its cause—and some of it could be politically painful. That includes easing protections on agricultural products that benefit Indian farmers—a crucial constituency.

Under the Radar

Governments around the world are trying to position themselves in ways that appeal to the new Trump administration, and Pakistan’s is no exception. Islamabad has sought to leverage Washington’s concerns about terrorism in the region by pitching itself as a useful counterterrorism partner; it recently helped the United States apprehend an IS-K militant.

Pakistan has now removed a two-year ban on imports of U.S. soybeans, allowing it to resume purchases of what was long a top Pakistani import from the United States. Islamabad is also trying to ramp up interest in its vast untapped critical mineral resources. And, perhaps most interestingly, the country has taken steps to legalize cryptocurrency.

This month, Islamabad announced the establishment of the Pakistan Crypto Council to “integrate blockchain technology and digital assets” into its financial sector.

The council will be chaired by the finance minister and its board will include the governor of Pakistan’s state bank and the chairman of the country’s Securities and Exchange Commission, suggesting that Pakistan takes the initiative seriously. The CEO will be Bilal bin Saqib, a prominent young social entrepreneur.

Pakistan had long resisted legalizing crypto, citing the risks of fraud and money laundering. But in a recent Bloomberg interview, Saqib minced no words in articulating Islamabad’s motivations: “Trump is making crypto a national priority,” he said. “Every country including Pakistan will have to follow suit or we will be at the risk of being left behind.”

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Regional Voices

In Prothom Alo, researcher Altaf Parvez analyzes how Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have pursued economic recovery after political uprisings. “The world closely watches these two South Asian transformations, eager to see how each government fulfills the … expectations of its people, especially when much of their economic independence is under the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) influence,” he writes.

In Dawn, Pakistani diplomat Ashraf Jehangir Qazi calls for a national reconciliation process for Pakistan’s many internal struggles. “What is absolutely required is a Nelson Mandela-like initiative to help heal the country and bring about a national reconciliation,” he writes. “There need not be any losers on this road to Pakistan’s liberation.”

A Kuensel editorial warns that Bhutan must end the stigma attached to tuberculosis, which poses a threat in the country. “Many people with the disease suffer in silence, fearing social rejection. This must change,” it argues. “TB is not a disease of the past, nor is it a condition linked to poverty or personal failure—it is a public health emergency that affects all sections of society.”